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Abstract- The issue of downloading illegal material from a 
website onto a personal digital device is considered from the 
perspective of conventional (Pascalian) probability theory. We 
present quantitative results for a simple model system by which 
we analyse and counter the putative defence case that the 
forensically recovered illegal material was downloaded 
accidentally by the defendant. The model is applied to two actual 
prosecutions involving possession of child pornography. 
Keywords- Probability theory; digital forensics; quantification 
of plausibility; digital forensic hypotheses; possession of child 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Conventional forensic practitioners have an admirable 
tradition of employing statistical techniques and probability 
theory to interpret their findings quantitatively for prosecution 
authorities and courts of law. For example, the probability that 
two identical DNA samples do not arise from the same 
individual has been quantified as approximately one in a 
billion, whereas the probability of two matching fingerprints 
belonging to two different individuals is rated at one in a 
million. 
Digital forensic practitioners, by contrast, have been slow 
to follow suit, generally preferring to make qualitative 
statements about the significance of their evidence. In an effort 
to introduce a degree of quantitative rigour into the field of 
digital forensics the application of Bayesian networks [1-6] 
and aspects of complexity theory [7-lO] has recently been 
explored as a means of quantifying the plausibility of digital 
forensic hypotheses. The present paper aims to extend this 
approach by utilising conventional probability theory to 
analyse and interpret the significance of recovered digital 
forensic evidence. 
Prosecutions for the possession of illegally downloaded 
material have caused serious problems for digital forensic 
examiners and prosecution authorities for well over a decade. 
Previous studies [7-lO] have analysed the plausibility of the 
Trojan Horse Defence (THD) [11-15 ], which has frequently 
been successfully employed against prosecutions for the 
possession of child pornography (CP) images [lO, 16-17]. 
In this paper we address another commonly offered defence 
against the possession of CP images, when only a small 
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proportion of the recovered downloaded material is illegal. A 
typical real-world example is the recovery of a small number 
of CP images amongst a much larger number of adult 
pornography (AP) or other images. In such a situation, the 
defence might claim that the defendant only intended to 
download non-CP images, but because the website also 
happened to contain some CP images intermixed, a few of 
these were accidentally or unintentionally downloaded along 
with the intended non-CP images. 
What credence can be given to such a claim, ceteris paribus 
(everything else being equal)? In particular, what proportion of 
CP images needs to be present in the download in order for the 
prosecution to refute the defence's claim beyond a reasonable 
doubt? In the present paper we address these questions by 
means of conventional probability theory applied to a number 
of distinct scenarios based on two actual criminal cases. In 
order to carry through the analysis it has been necessary to 
make a number of simplifying assumptions regarding the 
downloading context and these have been itemised below. 
In the next section we present our analytical models and set 
out the principal assumptions upon which they are based. Our 
results for two fully-documented criminal cases are to be found 
in the subsequent sections, where they are discussed and 
interpreted in the context of the relevant legal framework. The 
fmal section contains our summary and conclusions, together 
with a generalisation of the domain of applicability of our 
analytical models. 
II. PROBABILITY THEORETIC MODELS 
Let the number of distinct downloaded CP images be nc, 
and the number of distinct downloaded AP or other images be 
na. Thus the total number of distinct downloaded images 
recovered is nd = nc + na. 
Since the precise contents of the overseas websites from 
which each of the downloads was made cannot usually be 
investigated by the local law enforcement officers, it is 
necessary to make the assumption that the proportion of CP 
images in the download reflects the proportion of CP images in 
the website as a whole (i.e. that the download is a 
representative sample of the website). Let the (unknown) total 
number of images available for download from the website be 
N, then the estimated number of CP images on the website is 
Ne = N x (nc Ind) and the estimated number of non-CP images 
is Na = N x (na Ind) where N= Nc + Na. 
We wish to determine expressions for the probability Pk 
that precisely k (0 ::( k ::( min[Nn ndD distinct CP images are 
present amongst the nd distinct downloaded images. For this 
purpose we assume that the website is organised in such a way 
that any CP images are located randomly amongst the non-CP 
images, rather than in a special section, so that the website 
owner could plausibly claim that the CP images were uploaded 
inadvertently. We consequently assume that the defendant 
encounters the CP images randomly while browsing the 
website contents and selected the image thumbnails for 
downloading as an integral part of the browsing operation. 
Within the context outlined above, three distinct scenarios 
can be distinguished. We have termed these scenarios: infmite, 
finite and greedy, respectively. In the infinite scenario, the 
number of distinct images available for download from the 
website is so large that it is effectively infinite and therefore 
the probability of selecting either a CP image or an AP image 
does not change as the download proceeds. In the finite 
scenario, the number of distinct images available for download 
from the website is definite and so the probabilities of selecting 
a distinct CP or AP image vary with the progress of the 
download. The greedy scenario is a special case of non-random 
behaviour in which the defendant downloads the complete 
contents of the website; in this case ne = Ne; na = Na; nd = N. 
A. infinite scenario 
Since the probabilities of selecting a CP image and a non­
CP image are both fixed at Pc = (Ne IN) and Pa = (Na IN) 
respectively, where Pc + Pa = 1, the binomial theorem [18] can 
be applied directly: 
R - mo.) . . 1< t], ,, - . i\: . i\: - \ k Pc Pa (1) 
Here (� ) is the number of different ways of selecting k 
objects from nddistinct objects. 
B. Finite scenario 
The probabilities of selecting a CP image and a non-CP 
image both vary as the images are being selected, on the 
assumption that no image is downloaded more than once. This 
is equivalent to the well-known scenario of selecting k black 
balls and (nd - k) white balls randomly from a bag initially 
containing Ne black balls and Na white balls respectively: 
,f,: - 1 fl d - k + 1 
p, = md ) nN<- i n N,,-j = (Nc) ( N" )/(N) K \ k . N - i . N - k -j k nd - k nd (2) ' � D l � D 
Here the first and second products address the probabilities 
of selecting black and white balls respectively. Note that the 
right-hand expression, although elegant, is not suitable for 
practical computations involving large integer values such as 
will be encountered later, where the left-hand expression is 
implemented instead. 
C. Greedy scenario 
Since the defendant downloads the entire contents of the 
website it is certain that precisely nc = Nc CP images and na = 
Na AP images are downloaded. Hence the probability 
distribution is singular: 
(3) 
Here [) ij=1 if i = j and 0 if i -=1= j is Kronecker's delta [18]. 
III. Two CASE STUDIES 
Two actual criminal cases from the District Court of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HK SAR) 
involving the possession of CP images are now studied in more 
detail. 
Case 1: In District Court Criminal Case No. 968/2010, the 
defendant had over 30, 000 image files which he had 
downloaded on various occasions. Amongst them, there were 
63 still images and 185 video clips, all 248 of which image 
files were of CP. The others were indecent and obscene 
materials, plus cartoons and comic story books. 
Case 2: In DCCC No. 32/2013, the defendant had 714,430 
image files (including still images and video clips) which he 
had downloaded on various occasions. Amongst them, there 
were 84 video clips which were of CP. The others were 
indecent and obscene materials. 
In both cases, the image files were downloaded over a 
substantial period of time, involving a number of separate 
downloading sessions, making use of more than one website. 
All of the recovered image files had been opened and viewed 
by the defendants, on their own admission, so no metadata 
evidence was collected by law enforcement investigators to 
verify this independently . 
The legal documentation regarding prosecution for 
possession of CP in HK SAR are available for reference [19-
22], but for the purposes of this discussion they may be 
summarised as follows. Section 3(3) makes it an offence for 
any person to have in his possession any CP materials. The 
elements of the offence of possession of CP are: (i) possession 
(i.e., having custody or control) of the image files; and (ii) 
knowing the nature of the image files' contents (i.e., being CP). 
Thus, a bare confession that: "I downloaded them" and "I 
opened them to view" is sufficient. In the absence of such a 
confession, the prosecution needs to demonstrate both (i) and 
(ii) beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, (ii) requires the 
prosecution to show that the defendants knew that they 
possessed something (mens rea or 'guilty mind') and that the 
something they possessed was indeed CP (i.e., that it contained 
a pornographic depiction, and that the subject of that depiction 
was a child under the age of 16 years). The defendants could in 
principle have pleaded not guilty and fought the prosecution 
case, claiming that they did not view any of the downloaded 
images or that they viewed them only as thumbnails and hence 
did not see them clearly enough to be able to make an informed 
judgment regarding the ages of the depicted individuals. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The quantitative results for both the infmite and finite 
scenarios of both actual cases are presented in Table l. For the 
fmite case, the representative value for N has been (somewhat 
arbitrarily) chosen as the smallest power of 10 greater than nd. 
Thus, for case 1, nd = 30, 000 and N = 105, while for case 2, nd 
= 714,430 and N = 106• Values of Pk are set out for k = 1, 10, 
20, nc 14, nc 12 and for the maximum of the distribution at k = 
nc, where k represents the number of downloaded CP images. 
In Figures 1 - 4 the four probability distributions are shown 
graphically over the range 0 � k � min [Ne , ndl Note that in 
Figure 3 the probability distribution is truncated at k=118 
which is the value of Nc in this case. It should be mentioned 
here that these computations require the use of extended range 
programming techniques since intermediate values with 
magnitudes in the range [10-10°°, 1010°°] are created, which lie 
well beyond the range available from the IEEE-75 4 64-bit 
floating-point representation of [10-322, 10322]. 
Inspection of Table 1 and Figures 1-4 reveals a number of 
interesting features. Although the probability distributions are 
quite strongly peaked and not greatly skewed, their maxima at 
k = nc all lie between 2.5 % and 8%. That is, there is at the very 
most a chance of 2.5 %-3.0% in case 1 and 4.0%-8.0% in case 
2 that the CP image files were downloaded by means of 
inadvertent, random behaviour on the part of the defendant. 
The difference between the infinite and the finite scenarios in 
each case is directly related to the numerical ratio between nd 
and N; in case 1, Nnd= 3.333, whereas in case 2, Nnd= 1.400. 
As a consequence, in case 1 the finite scenario reproduces the 
infinite scenario much more closely than in case 2 where N is 
only slightly greater than nd. In both cases, the finite scenario 
yields a higher maximum probability than the infmite scenario 
due to the restriction of the number of images on the website to 
N in the finite scenario. The variances of the binomial 
distributions for cases 1 and 2 (infinite scenarios) are both very 
close to their respective means at 245 .95 and 83.00, while their 
skewnesses are 0.0627 and 0.1091 respectively. Ca. 95 % of the 
probability density is located within the ranges k= [217, 279] or 
±12.6% for case 1 and k= [66, 102] or ±21.7% for case 2. The 
probability of accidentally or unintentionally downloading k 
CP images is exceedingly small, although always non-zero, 
towards the tails of the distribution (see the topmost lines of 
Table 1). However, even close to the mean the probability lies 
well below 10% in both scenarios of the two actual cases 
studied here. 
It will be noted that the models presented here make a 
number of simplitying assumptions about the downloading 
behaviour of the defendant, namely: a single session, a single 
website, a single user and a single computer. In fact it took the 
defendant in case 2 around two years to download the 714,430 
image files from several websites. However, it appears unlikely 
that these assumptions would invalidate our model since a 
defendant's behaviour would be expected to remain fairly 
consistent between successive sessions and websites. 
Since no corroborating metadata was recovered by the law 
enforcement officials, it is not known for certain whether either 
of the defendants had actually opened and viewed the CP 
image files; their admissions of guilt were accepted in lieu of 
locating such evidence. Had the defendants elected to plead not 
guilty, not only would the metadata associated with their CP 
image files have had to be located and recovered, but the 
accuracy of the age discrimination between the CP and AP 
images might also have been challenged. 
Furthermore, under some circumstances it might be 
possible for the defence to argue that the number of 
downloaded CP images files was not sufficiently statistically 
significant to be considered a representative sample of the 
website contents as a whole. In particular, if the defendants 
were to claim that they were searching for a particular type of 
non-CP image then their searching and selecting strategy might 
not conform to the random browsing and downloading 
behaviour envisaged in the present model. 
One final comment is in order: if a website that the 
defendant browsed was promoted or advertised as containing 
only non-CP material, the defendant might claim that the 
downloaded CP images were present as the result of a content 
management error on the part of the website's owner. This 
could lead to contention over the responsibility for the presence 
and distribution of the CP material - a case of caveat emptor 
(let the customer beware) or in dubio pro reo (when in doubt 
find for the accused)? 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have shown how conventional probability 
theory can be used to provide answers to questions that digital 
forensic examiners and prosecution authorities are likely to 
pose with regard to the presence of a small proportion of CP 
image files amongst a large number of downloaded non-CP 
image files. By making some simplitying but not unreasonable 
assumptions about the image selection and downloading 
process we have shown that in the very worst case (from the 
prosecution's perspective) the probability of this occurring 
unintentionally in the two actual cases studied here is 2.5 -3.0% 
and 4.0-8.0% respectively. The principal conclusion to be 
drawn from our results may be summarised as follows: the 
probability of randomly downloading a small number of CP 
files amongst a large number of non-CP files is in general 
exceedingly small and, even at its maximum, lies well below 
10% in both scenarios of the two actual cases studied here. 
Results such as these can be used to provide a quantitative 
input into the decision-making processes of law enforcement 
and prosecution authority officials. While we are aware of 
complementary approaches using subjective probability 
assessment, for example [23], our aim here is to be as 
rigorously quantitative as possible. 
A related issue for law enforcement investigators is that a 
full confession is more easily elicited from a suspect when they 
are confronted with a full account of their actions as 
reconstructed from the recovered evidence. Thus, it may be 
considered that the police were fortunate to secure confessions 
in the two actual cases studied here, without first having 
recovered detailed meta-data evidence to place before the 
suspects. It should be regarded as standard professional due 
diligence to do so, rather than to rely on eliciting a confession. 
It would also be interesting to compare the two Hong Kong 
cases studied here with those from other jurisdictions. 
The approach described here is by no means restricted to 
illegal downloads of CP material. It is capable of being applied 
to a much broader class of problems, most notably in the 
commercial and business world. For example, an employee is 
accused of stealing company confidential information and a 
number of such files are found in his PC desktop. Does this 
constitute sufficient grounds for civil litigation? How likely is 
it that the files were downloaded and then forgotten to be 
removed? As a second example, an employee is accused of 
attacking the company network but only a few incidents of 
short duration were actually detected. Does this constitute 
sufficient grounds for a criminal prosecution? 
This raises a more general question: in the digital or cyber 
domain, there are many human initiated events that are 
anomalous and potentially illegal; how many such events 
should be considered sufficient to warrant further action in 
terms of either a civil or a criminal prosecution? We consider 
this to be a question that merits further study in the future. 
TABLE I. SELECTED VALUES OF THE PROBABILITY OF RANDOMLY 
DOWNLOADING K CP IMAGE FILES IN CASES I AND 2 ACCORDING TO THE 
FINITE AND THE INFINITE SCENARIOS. 
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